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European Monetary Union: limits
to growth or bifurcation point*
OLEKSANDR SHAROV1
ABSTRACT. The paper presents the background and process of the EU monetary
union establishment with regard to historical experience of European countries in-
volving previous attempts of currency integration between separate countries. The
author also analyzes methods of solving various theoretical and practical problems
arising during the process. In particular, it is pointed out that the majority of the
problems were caused by neglecting monetary integration principles, the need for ob-
serving which had been clearly stated yet at the preliminary stages of the integration
process. Special emphasis is made on reviewing current development stage of the
monetary union, in particular, with regard to problems caused by the financial crisis
in “peripheral countries” of the Union as well as by concurrent intensification of co-
operation in the field of banking and fiscal issues. In this context, the trends of fur-
ther European monetary integration development are also considered. As resulted
from analysis, the author concludes that the European Monetary Union had ex-
hausted its energy for development along previously assigned trajectory and reached
the bifurcation point, whereas its further improvement or gradual preservation and
decline depend upon the direction in which the point is passed.
KEY WORDS: currency exchange rate, monetary union, euro, European currency
snake, single currency
Introduction
The range of problems related to the European Monetary
Union establishment and functioning proves one of the most
widely and profoundly analyzed by both domestic and foreign
authors such as economists, theorists, bankers and businessmen,
politicians and analysts, speaking of which the classical work by
R. Mundell2 is to be mentioned with its main provisions
considered the European Monetary Union theoretical basis. As
regards more recent studies, the mentioned processes are
described detailed enough in works by K.Dyson3, as well as in
those by D. Gros and N.Thygesen4. The detailed reviewing of the
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monetary union establishment legal aspects is provided in the
work by R.M. Lastra, the British International Financial Law
Professor5. Interesting outlook from the perspective of
professionals observing the monetary union further development
problems a bit 'from outside' is presented in the work by
professional financiers J. Nordvig and N. Firoozye6, as well as in
that by the Union potential members – Polish bankers
S. Kawalec and E. Pytlarczyk.7
In general, experts have no single opinion as to the reasons
leading to the monetary union crisis. The most common, however,
is the so-called “German view” criticizing fiscal discipline
violations in some countries. Another one (the “Keynesian view”)
lays the blame for the crisis on major sovereign debts in
peripheral countries resulting in sustained current account
imbalance of the eurozone peripheral countries (which, after the
2008 financial crisis proved impossible to finance by means of
raising debt capital on the market basis). As already mentioned,
in this regard the main issues are related to the impossibility of
applying own national monetary and exchange rate policy. Thus,
“the [k]ey challenge to the eurozone is that the currency
regulation mechanisms are not working, therefore it is required to
find new tools for steadying the external imbalances situation in
terms of the classical payment balance crises. The current
eurozone policy aimed at liquidity support for distressed countries
only exacerbates the accumulated imbalances and fails to provide
for the crisis situation overcoming”8. At the same time, the single
monetary policy can not always take into account different
objectives inherent in the eurozone economies as a result of quite
different levels of economic, social and institutional development.
Particularly significant problems arise from the differences in the
banking and fiscal system of the EU countries.
The mentioned problems take on special significance for
Ukraine after signing the free trade agreement with the European
Union, since interest in the developments of monetary relations
within the Union is thus transferred from the purely theoretical
plane into that of practice.
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Historical retrospective of the monetary union
establishment in Europe
The first attempt of creating a monetary union in the contem-
porary (modern) history of Europe could perhaps imply the Latin
Monetary Union. As in late March 1803 (on 7 Germinal, Year 9
of the French Revolution) France introduced a new monetary
system based on the decimal system of calculation, this caused
practical interest in many countries. The adopted law introduced
a new currency (the 5 gram, 90 percent fine silver franc) as well
as affirmed the fixed ratio between silver and gold at the rate of
15.5:1 as established by a royal edict dating back to October
1785. The new monetary system convenience has led to first Bel-
gium (in 1832) and subsequently Switzerland (in 1850) and Italy
(in 1862) introducing the same monetary system, thus de facto
ensuring common monetary area functioning based not on for-
mal agreements and administrative regulation, but on the
purely market mechanism. However, the 1850 discovery of large
gold deposits in California and subsequent influx of the “yellow
metal” to Europe gradually led to the market mechanism
“malfunctioning”: during 1852-1861 the average price ratio of sil-
ver and gold in the market amounted to 15.37:19. Naturally, un-
der such circumstances speculative trading gained widespread, as
conditioned by Copernicus Gresham law. In this regard, the
“monetary unification” had to be revived through administrative
measures.
Latin Monetary Union (L'Union monйtaire latine) was estab-
lished in November 1865 (started functioning in 1866) by France,
Belgium, Italy and Switzerland formally agreeing to bring their
currencies to the bimetallic standard with the fixed ratio between
silver and gold of 15.5 to 1 (4.5 grams of fine silver and 0.290322
grams of fine gold). Coins of the Union member countries were
mutually accepted by national treasuries as legal tender. The
agreement was reached that the Monetary Union would remain
effective until 1880. Gradually, several more countries joined the
Union: Spain and Greece (1868), Austria-Hungary, Venezuela,
Serbia, San Marino and States of the Church (1889). Certain
other countries also used the Latin Monetary Union standards in
practice, while not joining it formally (Albania, Bulgaria, Roma-
nia, etc.). In 1885, the gold content of Russian coins was fixed at
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the level identical to that of French coins. Earlier still, a similar
gold content (with no reference to silver) had been adopted for
the Finnish mark. The monetary integration policy was regarded
by France in the context of general political line to create a pan-
European confederation, and thus the monetary union was to
become the first stage of the general unification of the Euro-
pean countries.
However, contradictions to market economy requirements
inherent in the agreements kept manifesting themselves also in
the future. Belgium was the first to raise alarm and was sup-
ported by France. Attempting to solve these problems, the Union
member states were forced to hold a series of international con-
ferences. The best known of those was the 1867 Paris Interna-
tional Monetary Conference held as a part of the World Exhibi-
tion programme. Some experts believe that it led to the gold
standard creation, which is partly true: the issue of bimetallism
abandonment at Prussia initiative was raised during debates and
soon thereafter (in 1871) the said country (gaining a significant
contribution from the defeated France) introduced the gold mark.
A gradual transition to the gold standard of some other countries
can therefore be considered as a certain alternative to the Latin
Monetary Union, although no similar unification was performed
between the “gold bloc” countries.
Possibly, the Latin Monetary Union imputation of leading to
economic stagnation resulting in World War I10 is too radical,
however certain negative lessons of its existence should certainly
be learned. First of all, the Latin Monetary Union experience has
shown that for a successful monetary union it is crucial that the
single currency exchange rate would be realistic and would not
cause incentives for speculative attacks. In addition, the mone-
tary union members should adhere to a common monetary policy.
At that, the monetary policy unification is only one of the mutual
concessions of a monetary union members, which should be sup-
plemented by rejecting independent monetary policies (as one of
the national sovereignty economic elements), in practice implying
transfer of authority for governing issues of money supply, price
level, interest rates and exchange rates to a common suprana-
tional body. Fiscal innovations can not be avoided, either.
The elimination of currency unions in Europe after World War
I due to their inefficiency did not however solve the all-European
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economic problems and after World War II Europe was hard
pressed again. Of all the European countries participating in the
war only the Great Britain experienced no GDP decline. Instead,
GDP of France fell to the 1891 level, whereas that of Germany
was decreased to the level of 1908. The lack of reliable currency
has led to significant restrictions of foreign trade, which had to
be based on the U.S. dollar, or even on barter.
Given such conditions, in July 1950 the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation created the European Payments
Union (EPU). The European Payments Union operating princi-
ple implied that at the end of each month the net balance of
payments between the member states was forwarded to the Bank
for International Settlements in Basel (appointed as the Union
payment agent) for subsequent offsetting claims. The remainders
were consolidated thus defining a positive or a negative balance
not of individual countries but of the Union as a whole. At that,
the balance was calculated in a conventional European unit
(European Unit of Account – EUA) equal to the U.S. dollar.
Debts were originally covered by loans, but in terms of ultimate
calculation implied payments in USD or in gold. Each country
had a 15 per cent quota of its trade volume with the Union
member states for 1949. As long as liabilities of a country to
EPU did not exceed 20 percent of its quota, the deficit financing
was automatically carried out by virtue of a loan and did not re-
quire repayment. However, if the liabilities exceeded the 20 per-
cent limit, immediate repayment of 20 percent of the total debt
in gold was imposed. Debts of 40, 60 and 80 per cent of the
quota were to be repaid in gold or USD. Positive balance was
treated similarly, but using other percentage limits. In case the
set quota was exceeded, settlements with the Union were made in
gold (unless subject to exceptional circumstances the EPU Board
expanded the credit volume related to such a country). The ac-
cumulated claims (positive balance) could be converted into
goods and hard currency (USD) only partially and subject to a
certain delay. Until the set quota was completely filled, the
creditor country could only receive gold within the 40 per cent of
its total net export to other EPU countries.
Such lending mechanism within EPU was beneficial not only
for the debtor countries, but also for the creditor countries, since
due to this system the creditor countries could expect at least a
partial payment for their goods in gold or USD (instead of trad-
ing against a totally non-convertible currency). In addition, the
creditor countries were to make a smaller contribution in gold to
the initial capital than the debtor countries (the difference was
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covered by a special loan to EPU from the USA in the amount of
USD 350 million under the Marshall Plan). At that, the existing
rules provided for financial assistance depending on actual efforts
of a debtor to remedy the situation. Provided the efforts exceeded
the set debt quota, independent experts and the EPU Board
would prepare proposals to the Council of the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation on adjusting economic policy of
the respective debtor country. Thus, certain guarantees were pro-
vided that the debtor country would be able to improve its eco-
nomic state and repay the debts. Finally, the EPU membership
rules stipulated gradual trade liberalization, establishment of
common customs duties for all member states to be followed by
their significant reduction. Such an approach contributed to ac-
tive development of multilateral trade. Trade volumes between
the EPU countries increased from USD 10 billion in 1950 to
USD 23 billion in 1959. Although trade with the United States
developed at a slow pace, during this period the USD reserves of
the EPU countries have doubled.
The European Payments Union existed from July 1, 1950 to
December 27, 1958, as  it was eliminated due to restoration of
the member states currency convertibility. During this time, the
balance of payments (both surplus and deficit in mutual trade) of
the EPU amounted to USD 46 billion with circa half thereof
(USD 20 billions) repaid on the payment exchange basis, a quar-
ter thereof (USD 12.6) repaid due to subsequent changes in the
state of balance (occurrence of surplus, through which previous
deficit temporarily credited by EPU was repaid), whereas pay-
ments in gold or hard currency were made for redemption of
debts only in the amount of USD 10.7 billion (i.e. payments in
foreign currency have been reduced by more than 75 percent)11.
The EPU was replaced by the European Monetary Agreement
signed back on July 29, 1955 and entering into force on Decem-
ber 27, 1958 being aimed at further development of foreign trade
and currency convertibility. The Agreement was governed by the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. The
Agreement stipulated establishment of the European Fund in the
amount of USD 600 million (in July 1959 after Spain had joined
the Fund, the amount was increased to USD 607.5 million). The
funds were used for crediting temporary payment balance deficits.
In September 1961 the Agreement was joined by the United
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States and Canada. At the end of 1972, the Agreement was ter-
minated with functions of crediting payment balance deficits of
Western countries transferred to the International Monetary
Fund in full.
Unlike EPU, the European Monetary Agreement provided not
quite for creation of a payment system, but rather a kind of
“code of conduct” of the member states in terms of their curren-
cies convertibility. In particular, the countries voluntarily re-
stricted fluctuations of their currencies against USD by means of
0.75 % exchange rate band (although the IMF rules set a 1 %
limit). In addition, the countries provided each other with cer-
tain limited guarantees of compensation in case of exceeding cur-
rency fluctuation limits. From a technical point of view, the
agreement did not provide for the automatic crediting of deficits
(as in the EPU): European Fund loans were granted under indi-
vidual terms with the crediting period not exceeding 2 years. At
that, the European Fund Board of Directors held regular consul-
tations with debtor countries on improvement of their monetary
policies and practical issues of payments balance adjustment12.
The Treaty of Rome on the European Economic Community
establishment was based on the fact that the issues implying bal-
ance of payments adjustment (including by means of exchange
rate adjustment) as well as ensuring confidence in national cur-
rencies fell within the competence of national governments and
central banks cooperating on a bilateral basis. However, as early
as in 1962 the European Commission has prepared a package of
proposals on coordination in the field of monetary and economic
policy within the entire integration process. In 1969, the initia-
tive for greater coordination of economic and monetary coopera-
tion was expressed in Barre Report, which recognized that con-
clusions on the common agricultural policy indicated that its
impact went well beyond the basic sector of the economy and
concerned also the general level of prices, government finance
and monetary relations between the Community member states13.
In this regard, proposals were introduced as to implementing
closer ties between strong cooperation in the field of economic
policy and the implementation of a monetary cooperation mecha-
nism within the European Economic Community based on the
Treaty of Rome principles. At the same time it was emphasized
                     
12 Ungerer H. A Concise History of European Monetary Integration: From EPU to EMU, 1997, p.30
13 Commission Memorandum to the Council on the co-ordination of economic policies and monetary
co-operation within the Community / Secretariat of the Commission, Feb.12, 1969,  p.5 — [Electronic
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that such monetary cooperation mechanism should not be seen as
a replacement of the international monetary cooperation mecha-
nism. On the contrary, it should be set up in such a format so it
could completely work with the international mechanism without
additional complications and would not affect obligations of the
Community member states to the international currency (mone-
tary) institutions14. Upon consideration of these proposals at the
Hague meeting in March 1969, the heads of the Community
states and governments pointed out some fundamental principles
based on which the economic and monetary Community should be
established. In particular, this implied the free trade principle
and coordination with the processes taking place in the interna-
tional economic relations as well as within the system of interna-
tional economic cooperation in general. Special attention was
paid to the exchange rate fixing system. The outcome document
of the meeting pointed out the importance of ensuring their sta-
bility and inadmissibility of the flexible exchange rate fixing sys-
tem (including the so-called 'crawling peg'), since this would
contribute not to unification (convergence) as such, but to sepa-
ration of national economies rather. A resolution as to the phase-
based principle of establishing the economic and monetary union
was also adopted: the first phase (1970-71) implied that the work
was focus on solving preliminary issues; the second phase (1972-
75) implied preparation to the union establishment, whereas and
the third phase (1976-78) was dedicated to the actual union es-
tablishment15.
In March 1970, a special Committee was established (headed
by P. Werner, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg) and entrusted
with preparing a plan for the monetary union establishment. Ac-
cording to Barre Report recommendations, the central banks cre-
ated a balance of payments support fund, from which member
states could receive up to USD 1 billion for the period of up to 6
months. In October of the same year, the Special Committee re-
port was published laying out the monetary union phase-based es-
tablishment plan with the phases ranging from solid fixing of re-
ciprocal rates to the single currency introduction.
Approaches of the experts preparing the report came to differ.
The German experts (in particular, K. Schiller) as well as Dutch
ones and some Italian experts believed that the wording
                     
14 Ibid., p.12
15 Commission memorandum to the Council in the preparation of a plan for the phased establishment
of an economic and monetary union/ Commission of the European Communities, Secretariat-General :
Brussels, 4 March 1970, pp.5,6,10 — [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/emu_history/documentation/compendia/19700304en019commplanphasese.pdf
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“economic and monetary union” itself meant that firstly an eco-
nomic union should be created followed by establishing the
monetary one. The French and Belgian members of the group ar-
gued instead that economic convergence was logically based on a
more profound cooperation in the field of monetary matters.
Therefore, from their perspective it was necessary to promptly
make decisions on restricting exchange rate fluctuations, creation
of a common reserve fund, etc. This difference in approaches re-
flected diversity between the French and German visions of fur-
ther integration. Perception of the prospects supported by France
was based on the fact that the economic system of the Commu-
nity with the fixed exchange rates would allow member states to
maintain national sovereignty in matters of economic and fiscal
policy. However, this did not comply with the interests of more
stable countries, primarily, Germany, which argued that creation
of a monetary union without economic harmonization was
doomed to failure. Moreover, they suspected that countries hav-
ing permanent problems with balance of payments (such as
France) focused on creation of a monetary union in order to be
able to resolve this problem without implementing the necessary
economic reforms, through using common reserve funds for deficit
financing (with the funds to be provided mainly by Germany). P.
Werner himself tried to stick to a neutral position and supported
parallel measures for economic and monetary cooperation (al-
though in certain expressions at the early stages of the report
preparation he inclined to the “monetarist perspective”).
Another cause of the disagreement was the issue of establishing
supranational bodies in the field of economic and monetary pol-
icy. K. Schiller, the Germany's Federal Minister of Economic Af-
fairs, advocated strong coordination of fiscal policy at the EEC
level, up to establishment of common bodies (such as the Central
Bank) inclusive. Instead, the French again opposed any proposals
that could lead to the national sovereignty restriction.
Werner Plan was at last officially presented on October 8,
1970 at the EEC Council of Ministers meeting in Luxembourg.
The main idea was to create a common area where goods, serv-
ices, workforce and capital could move freely, while foreign cur-
rency transactions would not stumble upon any complications and
were not exposed to exchange rate risks. Such an economic and
monetary union implied not only introduction of a single cur-
rency (which would be supported by the single currency re-
serves), but also creating a common capital market as well as
achieving a high level of tax harmonization. This, in turn, still
provided for transfer of the right to make certain decisions from
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the national level to the 'European' one (especially, in terms of
fiscal policy) and centralization in the field of monetary policy16.
However, implementation of the adopted plan failed. The matter
was that the debate around European monetary integration took
place against the background of an acute global monetary system
crisis, which could not but affect the interests and plans of the
EEC states. Specifically, in August 1971, the United States de-
nied the right of central banks in other countries to convert U.S.
dollars into gold, which was actually made in response to the
demands of USD devaluation in relation to gold (in legal terms:
raising the official price of gold). After making that decision the
US Federal Reserve System Chairman P. Volcker went to Lon-
don for attending the 'group of 10' meeting where he attempted
to explicate the U.S. position. In particular, he spoke of the need
to transit to a system of floating exchange rates. However, only
Germany supported this approach at first. Naturally, the new
idea, alternative concepts of fixed exchange rates incorporated in
the EEC monetary union creation project had had negative im-
pact on the intention of the plan's rapid implementation. In late
November, the issue had been discussed at the principal meeting
of the “group of 10” in Rome. Currently, though, the issue spe-
cifically implied revaluating currencies of the OECD countries in
relation to the U.S. dollar by the average of 11 percent (and sub-
sequent transit of the German mark rate to free floating). How-
ever, the French finance minister claimed having no authority to
make such a decision. Therefore, discussion of the proposal be-
tween the U.S. and France was adjourned to mid-December along
with supplementing agenda with a meeting between the two
Presidents in the Azores. During the negotiations, G. Pompidou
(representing the position of all EEC countries) succeeded in
reaching an agreement with R. Nixon as to devaluation of the
U.S. dollar by 8.5 % (from USD 35 to 38 per 1 tr. ounce). As a
result of these negotiations, France refused to implement Werner
Plan.
However, this did not imply total refusal from European coun-
tries cooperation in matters of monetary policy. The U.S. dollar
devaluation agreement reached in the Azores had been formally
approved three days beforehand at a meeting of the 'group of 10'
finance ministers and heads of the central banks in Washington,
and called 'The Smithsonian Agreement'. The Agreement also
                     
16 Danescu, Elena Rodica. ‘The Werner Report’/ CVCE, 2012, pp.2-3 — [Electronic resource]. —
Access mode: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/%20the_werner_report-en-baa6e5b2-7db4-4c43-8412-3cb2eb631
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provided for the extension of the currency fluctuation limits
against the U.S. dollar by ± 2,25 % factor. At the same time, the
EEC countries decided to proceed with de facto implementation
of at least certain provisions of the Werner Plan, the result of
which was signing the Basel Accord in March 1972 introducing
the exchange rate coordination mechanism known as the
“European snake in the tunnel”. The EEC Member States have
extended the limits of reciprocal currency fluctuation by ±
1,125 %, i.e. the currency mutual fluctuation corridor was wid-
ened to 2.25 %. According to the Smithsonian Agreement all the
IMF members should provide for the maximum permissible ex-
change rate deviation in relation to USD making ± 2,25 %, i.e.
the total fluctuation amount was not to exceed 4.5 %. Thus, mu-
tual currency exchange rate fluctuation of European currencies
was concentrated in a narrow range (“the snake”), but in relation
to the American currency it could not go beyond a wider range
(“the tunnel”). Use of this regime proved short-lived, as it
caused serious difficulties and contradictions.
Further search for new forms of monetary integration has led
to the EEC Council establishing the European Monetary Coop-
eration Fund in April 197317 with its task being to provide finan-
cial support in assuring exchange rate stability (subject to the
“currency snake” mechanism). The Fund's financial resources
were accrued by depositing 20 percent of the gold and foreign
currency reserves of the member countries and accounted in the
conventional European Currency Unit (ECU)∗ equal to
0.88867088 grams of fine gold (i.e. meeting the USD “gold con-
tent” prior to its devaluation two months before), whereas the
Bank for International Settlements in Basel was appointed as
agent of the Fund. It was expected that the Fund would operate
until introduction of the single European currency.
Under these conditions the “European currency snake” coun-
tries cancelled their currency exchange rate fluctuation limits
against the U.S. dollar and other currencies (i.e., the “snake”
went out of the “tunnel”). At the same time the mutual EEC
countries currency exchange rate fluctuation limits were ex-
                     
17 Regulation (EEC) No 907/73 of the Council of 3 April 1973 establishing a European Monetary
Cooperation Fund/ Official Journal of the European Communities 05.04.73, pp. L 89/2-3 — [Electronic
resource]. — Access mode:  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation/chapter6/
19730403en04euromonetcoopregul.pdf
∗ It should be noted that European Unit of Account equivalent to USD 1.00 as established back in 1950
within the European Payments Union circulated in parallel. After EPU winding-up in mid 1950s, this unit
was still used within the settlement system under the Lome Convention on EEC trade cooperation with the
“third world” countries and in operation of the European Investment Bank. Since 1975, it was accounted on
the “currency basket” basis (initially, similar to the SDR “basket” and amounting to USD 1.20635) and used
in all EEC institutions, temporarily replacing the European Currency Unit — ECU
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panded to ± 2,25 %. This renewed regime was not joined by
Great Britain, Italy and Ireland. Due to the foreign exchange po-
sition instability during 1974-1978 the following European cur-
rencies had to be withdrawn from the “currency snake” regime:
the Italian lira – in 1973, the French franc – in 1974, and the
second time in 1976 (after returning to the system in 1975), the
Swedish krona – in 1977, and the Norwegian krone – in 1978.
This situation has forced the EEC countries to seek another op-
tion of deepening monetary cooperation, which resulted in estab-
lishing the European Monetary System (EMS) in March 1979.
The main element of the new system was the renewed European
Currency Unit calculated on the basis of own “currency bas-
ket”∗∗, in relation to which parities of EEC countries currencies
were established. In case their rate fluctuation exceeded permissi-
ble limits, central banks of the ECU member countries were
obliged to redeem currencies of the partners in unlimited
amounts. The main rate fluctuation limit in relation to ECU was
set at ±2.25 % of mutual central rates for seven currencies, and
±6 % for the eight one – the Italian lira. The exchange rate
“abnormal” state indicator was the so-called 'threshold of maxi-
mum divergence'18. In case of the relevant currency exchange rate
reaching the said “threshold”, the banks were obliged to take ac-
tion for its stabilization. This system was called the Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM).
The initial ECU issue was based on the deposits available at
the European Monetary Cooperation Fund as well as on portions
of the gold and foreign currency reserves of the EMU member
states (per 20 % of each type of reserves). These deposits were
regarded as three-month loans. At that, gold deposited with
EMCF was valued at the average market price for the last 6
months (but not exceeding the market price on the penultimate
day of the period), whereas deposits in USD were converted to
ECU based on the U.S. dollar market value fixed two business
days prior to the date of conversion.
In 1986, the Single European Act has introduced certain eco-
nomic prerequisites of fair and loyal competence as well as long-
                     
∗∗ From the previous version it was distinguished, above all, by including only European currencies
(i.e., the U.S. dollar was not included): it was originally based on the basket of the same nine currencies,
which once had formed the basis of European Unit of Account (EUA): the West German mark, the
French franc, the British pound sterling, the Dutch guilder, the Italian lira, the Belgian franc, the Irish
pound, the Danish krone and the Luxembourg franc. After joining the EMU by other countries, the
“basket” also incorporated their currencies: from 1984 — the Greek drachma, in 1989 — the Spanish
peseta and the Portuguese escudo. Upon creation the ECU was equal in value to the SDR, but gradually
this equality grew disrupted on account of their “baskets” different composition.
18 Apel E. European Monetary Integration : 1958 — 2002 — Routledge, 1998, p.68
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term stability in the domestic market. In addition, the Act re-
ferred to the European Monetary Union and deepening of the
monetary cooperation between the Community member states, in
particular, implying the European Monetary System and the
European Currency Unit. Under the Act relevant provisions were
introduced to a new article of the EC Treaty (Article 102 a). In
the same year, a decision was adopted at the EC Hanover June
summit to create an Ad hoc Committee for processing the new
plan for establishment of an economic and monetary union
(headed by J. Delors, the President of the European Commis-
sion).
The Delors Committee report on the EMU in the European
Community was officially presented in April 1989. The Commit-
tee recommended to proceed towards establishment of an eco-
nomic and monetary union in three phases whereby making sig-
nificant steps to ensuring economic convergence, price stability
and fiscal discipline before exchange rates of the member coun-
tries are fixed (including in terms of exchanging for the single
currency). The first phase (from July 1, 1990) stipulated intro-
ducing more profound coordination of actions; the second phase
implied institutional preparation for the final phase during which
exchange rates were to be fixed and exchange to the single cur-
rency was to be performed. Thus, the experts returned to the
ideas expressed in the Werner Plan, after all, which was later
acknowledged by J. Delors himself, saying: ‘It could be said that
the overall philosophy behind what we proposed and even the
structure of the Delors Report were very heavily influenced by
the Werner Report... The Delors Committee’s report is a direct
follow-on from the Werner Committee’s report’19.  No wonder,
since the Werner Plan always acted as a kind of ‘initiator’ of
ideas in discussions held in those days. This applies, in particular,
to such initiatives on further European integration in general as
the ‘Spierenburg Plan’, the ‘Report of Lord Cromer's Group’ and
the ‘Tindemans Report’, or to R. Mundell’s and G. Magnifico’s
concept of the ‘parallel currency’, as well as to a less known so-
called ‘All Saints Day Manifesto’∗.
                     
19 Danescu E. ‘The Werner Report and the Delors Report’, in A rereading of the Werner Report of 8
October 1970 in the light of the Pierre Werner family archives — Conclusion/ Sanem: CVCE, 2012, p.3
— [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2012/4/5/72dae01a-
6f2f-4b00-8caa-ba66db14dcac/ publishable_en.pdf
∗ In 1975, nine European economists addressed The Economist British weekly publication with a
manifesto proposing introduction of a parallel single currency — the 'Europa', exchange rate of which
with respect to national European currencies was supposed to be “floating” based on purchasing power
changes (that is, to be indexed against inflation rate). Since the journal issue was released on November
1, the article was jokingly called “The All Saints' Day Manifesto for European Monetary Union”,
implying that the “All Saints” notion would be applied to all European governments, provided they
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Economic and monetary union formation
In June 1989, at Madrid meeting the European Council gener-
ally approved the project of establishing the European Monetary
Union proposed by Delors Committee, and in December of the
same year it was decided at a meeting in Strasbourg to hold an
intergovernmental conference on the issue for developing a spe-
cific course of action. Real preparatory work was commenced at
the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) meeting
in July 1990, as the Monetary Committee’s report on the subject
was presented providing a detailed plan for implementing single
monetary policy and introduction of the single currency. The re-
port was approved by all Member States of the Community, with
exception of Great Britain. Next month, the European Commis-
sion formally identified four theses forming the economic and
monetary union basis:
– the monetary policy should be defined and implemented by
the new institution of the Community – the European Central
Bank.
– the main objective of the ECB (which should act regardless
of political pressure) is ensuring price stability.
– fiscal discipline should form the basis for close convergence
of economic policy trends of individual states.
– the future common EEC currency shall be the European
Currency Unit (ECU).
In December 1990, the second Intergovernmental Conference
was dedicated to discussing creation of a political union. At that,
consensus was reached that creation of a common market and an
economic union can not be considered accomplished with no sin-
gle currency introduced. Results of the two Intergovernmental
Conferences were recapitulated at the Maastricht Summit (De-
cember 9-10, 1991), where it was also decided to establish a po-
litical union with EEC replaced by the European Union. These
resolutions have been ratified by the European Parliament and
signed by the heads of states and governments of the Union in
April 1992 and called the Maastricht Treaty.
The economic and monetary union formation pursuant to the
Treaty envisaged three phases.
During the first phase (till December 31, 1993) all restrictions
on the free movement of capital within the European Union and
                                                                                                                                                   
agreed to the proposals. Later, the manifesto authors as members of expert groups published two reports
on the subject for the European Commission (Optica Report '75, Optica Report 1976).
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between the European Union and third countries have been
eliminated. Special attention was paid to ensuring convergence of
economic development indices within the EU, to which end the
member states adopted convergence programmes designed for sev-
eral years and identifying specific targets and anti-inflationary
and fiscal policy indicators. In terms of preparation for the intro-
duction of a single currency such programmes focused on achiev-
ing consistently low inflation indices, consolidation of public fi-
nances and stability of exchange rates in relations between
member states were presented to the EU Council for Economic
and Financial Affairs.
During the second phase (from January 1, 1994 to December
31, 1998) the EU member states implemented the policy aimed at
achieving widely known convergence criteria set forth by the
Maastricht Treaty. In addition to the mandatory conditions the
European Commission and European Central Bank retained the
right to assess the state and development of the balance of pay-
ments of a pre-Accession country, market integration results, spe-
cial workforce charges and other price indices.
Also during this phase (in 1994) the European Monetary In-
stitute was established replacing the European Monetary Coop-
eration Fund with its main task being determination of the legal,
organizational and material and technical prerequisites essential
for the European Central Bank (establishment of which was to
become a result of the Institute’s activity). The European Mone-
tary Institute was also responsible for strengthening coordination
of the Member States’ monetary policies on the eve of the eco-
nomic and monetary union establishment and as such authorized
to provide recommendations to the national central banks.
In 1995, the European Union was joined by Finland, Sweden
and Austria, whereas in December the European Council meeting
in Madrid adopted the programme for introduction of the single
currency, whose name was changed from the ECU to the euro.
The programme implementation provided for identifying countries
meeting the convergence criteria and being allowed to make tran-
sition to the euro, as it was performed in March 1998 with the
EU Commission presenting a report on the EU countries achiev-
ing the convergence criteria stipulated under the Maastricht
Treaty and thus recommending to admit eleven countries to the
monetary union (all EU countries except Great Britain, Den-
mark, Sweden and Greece). In general, by the end of the second
phase a noticeable convergence of the key macroeconomic indices
of the union member states was achieved along with real progress
in ensuring price stability, consolidation of public finances, re-
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ducing long-term interest rates, stabilizing the exchange rates of
national currencies.
During the third phase (from January 1999) of the economic
and monetary union formation the euro introduction programme
has been implemented comprising three stages:
 1. From January 1, 1999 to January 1, 2002: final fixing ex-
change rates of the EU member states national currencies, trans-
fer of bank and corporate non-cash payments to euro, conversion
of loans, deposits and long-term financial liabilities to euro,
commencement of the European Central Bank operation (as es-
tablished on the European Monetary Institute basis on June 1,
1998) as well as implementation of the single monetary policy in
cooperation with central banks of the EU member states.  During
1999-2001 in terms of non-cash settlements in the eurozone both
euro and related national currencies were used simultaneously.
The ‘no compulsion’ principle was applied: any business entity
had the right to choose the currency for invoicing or payment.
2. From January 1, 2002 to July 1, 2002: cash circulation of
banknotes and coins denominated in “euro” was introduced,
while circulation of the national currencies of the member states
was gradually eliminated.
3. From July 1, 2002: transition of all types of transactions
and payments within the European Economic and Monetary Un-
ion to the euro has been accomplished.
Introduction of the euro as a single currency pursued primarily
the aim implying establishment of the economic stability zone,
facilitating currency exchange and coordination of economic pol-
icy measures. Achievement of this goal required creation of a su-
pranational currency regulation and currency control system, to
which end the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) was
established with the purpose of maintaining price stability and
supporting the EU general economic policy20.
Monetary union functioning problems
Introduction of the single currency gave rise to the issue of
creating a new system of settlements under which all the cur-
rency union members would support real-time mode, allowing for
virtually instanteous payments in any Member State. Payments
within such a system would be possible only subject to availabil-
                     
20 Protocol (no 4) on the statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European
Central Bank — [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_statute_
from_c_ 11520080509en02010328.pdf
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ity of the necessary funds in a current (correspondent) account
with the respective central bank. Provided funds are available,
the transaction is performed immediately – in real time. In case
of lacking funds in the account, the transaction is enqueued until
the required amount is credited. This mechanism was called the
Real Time Gross Settlements (RTGS) system. Clearance and set-
tlement transactions in terms of national RTGS can be effected
throughout the eurozone. All national RTGS are linked through a
TARGET mechanism and form the European system of payments
in euro. At the same time (in parallel with RTGS) the traditional
correspondent banking mechanism is still applied allowing to
carry out transactions not only in euro, but also in other curren-
cies.
Fig. 1 Interconnection of the bank settlement systems
Source: Tymchenko M.N. History of the single European currency introduction and its aftermath
/Financial Management, No. 1, 2001 — [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: http://www.finman.ru/
articles/2001/1/577.html [In Russian].
Besides, an important role is played by the supranational
clearance systems of the European Banking Association – EURO
1 (in fact, being a commercial equivalent to RTGS) and STEP 1
(focused on settlements of small and medium-sized enterprises).
Upon introduction of the euro to the European economic and
monetary union currency system the EU territorial enlargement
process did not cease: in 2004 and 2007 another 12 states in
Europe joined the community, with 6 of them also joining the
eurozone: Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia
in 2009, Estonia in 2011 and Latvia in 2014.
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During this process, the same existing convergence criteria ap-
plied to new members with compliance extent assessed in accor-
dance with Article 121 of the Protocol on convergence criteria.
Among other things, it is stipulated that a country must for at
least two years apply a new exchange rate mechanism – the so-
called ERM-2 (Exchange Rate Mechanism), while its foreign ex-
change market should not experience too much pressure. The new
ERM-2 terms were set forth in the Resolution of the Amsterdam
European Council (June 1997) and the Agreement between the
ECB and the national central banks of the states outside eurozone
(September 1998). It has been provided that the central exchange
rates between the euro and national currencies are established
and adjusted by the ECB together with the central banks of the
respective countries. Temporary fluctuations are allowed within
15 %, whereas upon reaching the latter value national central
banks are obliged to ensure unrestricted intervention in the for-
eign exchange market in order to keep the exchange rate within
the prescribed limits. Thus, the new mechanism is quite compati-
ble with a wide range of exchange regulations with exception of
only three of those, namely: a) regulation omitting the agreed
central exchange rate against the euro; b) 'crawling peg'; c) regu-
lation implying peg to any other currency other than the euro.
Attention should without fail be drawn to the fact that a pre-
Accession country does have to transit to the fixed euro exchange
rate (as a penultimate stage of convergence) and such a country
may not during two years of the 'probation term' independently
manipulate the exchange rate of its national currency (e.g., in
order to enhance competitiveness of domestic producers).
Thus, the European Economic and Monetary Union (or the
“eurozone”) consists of 18 EU countries. Introduction of the euro
has brought them certain advantages. In particular, it should be
noted that foreign exchange risk has been eliminated, as were the
costs of conversion transactions, while financial markets have be-
come more stable and homogeneous, whereas organizational,
technical, legal and regulatory obstacles in the eurozone which
used to lead to segmentation and fragmentation of national mar-
kets have also been to a large degree done away with.
However, further expansion of the eurozone still remains
doubtful. As of January 1, 2015, Lithuania is supposed to join
the monetary union. Previously (in 2007), the country was re-
jected joining the eurozone because of failure to comply with
the 'inflation criterion' (by 0.1  %). This time a problem can
arise as well, but concerning the 'budget criterion': although
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the budget deficit is planned at 2.5  % of GDP (which is below
the 'access level' of 3 %), experts suggest the possibility of an
actual deficit increase, which might again jeopardize implemen-
tation of the single European currency in Lithuania. Besides,
level of support regarding transition to the euro in Lithuania is
not high enough21. Similar trends are also observed in Poland
(which has repeatedly announced its intention of joining the
monetary union: first, D. Tusk, the Polish Prime Minister had
announced at Krynica 2008 international forum that Poland
would join the monetary union in January 2012, however the
term was later shifted to 2014, 2015 and 2016). Today the
main problem in this respect implies lack of Seim support to
the government, required for introducing changes to the Con-
stitution of Poland which stipulates that the only issuing body
of the country is the National Bank of Poland. Provided there
is the required majority in the Polish government after the
2015 Parliamentary Elections (at that, political analysts say
such an opportunity is most likely to emerge in 2019 at the
earliest), all the same experts say that even after introducing
the changes for technical and organizational measures on intro-
duction of the euro the latter will have to take at least 6 years.
At that, a lot of things could change during this time. Already,
two of the three main economic arguments in favour of intro-
ducing a single currency (lower loan interest rates and in-
creased foreign investment) have lost their practical value to
Poland, whereas the third benefit (reduction of transaction
costs) is negated by such a disadvantage as the impossibility of
devaluating national currency for boosting international com-
petitiveness of the national economy (which 'peripheral coun-
tries' of the eurozone had faced)22. However, on the other
hand, an important political argument in favour of joining the
monetary union emerged: the threat of Russian intervention to
Ukraine has forced to ponder over the fact that more inte-
grated countries could expect a higher level of solidarity and
protection from their partners. Furthermore, Polish experts be-
lieve, closer ties with the eurozone contribute to feeling more
confident in the event of an economic crisis, which Russia
                     
21 Milne R. , Spiegel P. Lithuania shows rare enthusiasm for eurozone membership/ Financial
Times,Dec/30, 2013 — [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
a0ca35e0-54f9-11e3-86bc-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2wEBLTN00
22 „Poland did not join the euro zone” Puls Biznesu, 06 Lut.,2014 — [Electronic resource]. —
Access mode: http://www.pb.pl/ 3548621,26036,polska-nie-wejdzie-do-strefy-euro [In Polish].
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could cause in Europe23. From this point of view, joining the
eurozone may prove an additional 'safety lever'.
Joining the eurozone by other 'EU new member states' is primar-
ily restricted by the requirement of prior pegging national currency
to the euro. So far, this has been achieved only by Bulgaria. At
that, Bulgaria is experiencing significant problems as regards en-
suring compliance with criteria for joining the monetary union: in
the first place, due to weakness of its public finances (the budget
and the debt). Thus, according to P. Chobanov, the Bulgarian Fi-
nance Minister, Bulgaria will join the eurozone 'at the appropriate
time', as soon as the national economic situation grows favourable.
However, experts say it is likely to happen after four years at the
earliest24. Somewhat more optimistic is the perspective of the Ro-
manian neighbours: according to V. Ponta, the Prime Minister, the
country can join the economic and monetary union in 2018-202025.
Naturally, a more preferred term would be 2018 – just in time to
celebrate the 100th anniversary of the independence of Romania.
According to M. Singer, the President of Czech National Bank, in-
troduction of the single currency by the Czech Republic is also
planned around this period. However, for the time being this is not
regarded as a priority by the government. V. Orbбn, the Prime
Minister of Hungary, said the government had no plans whatsoever
as to introduction of the euro (in his opinion, such plans are un-
likely to be conceived in the next two or three decades).
We can conclude that the most efficient argument is the emo-
tional one: a EU Member State which has not introduced the single
currency would remain a minor member, as the 'eurozone is where
the heart of Europe beats'. However, the 'old Europe' countries out-
side the euro circulation area (Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden)
show no desire of joining the monetary union. In fact, Great Britain
is known to have expressed intention of withdrawing from the
European Union. In peripheral countries (PIIGS), there also were
calls for withdrawal from the eurozone (especially, in Greece). Al-
though, according to observers such calls would not entail serious
political consequences, they still do not yield much enthusiasm for
further development of the monetary union.
                     
23 Kamiсska A. Russia pushes us towards the euro / Rzeczpospolita, Mar.5, 2014, s.1 — [Electronic
resource]. — Access mode: http:// www.ekonomia.rp.pl/artykul/1091553.html?print=tak&p=0 [In
Polish].
24 AFP: Bulgaria like the euro /Vseki Den.com,28/12/2013 — [Electronic resource]. — Access
mode:  http://www.vsekiden.com/145127 [In Bulgarian].
25  Popescu V.   Victor Ponta: A realistic target for Romania's entry into the euro area is 2018 —
2020/ Mediafax, 19 nov 2013 — [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: http://www.mediafax.ro/
politic/victor-ponta-o-tinta-realista-pentru-intrarea-romaniei-in-zona-euro-este-2018-2020-11705984 [In
Romanian].
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Conclusions
Thus, all the facts indicate that currently the European
Monetary Union has exhausted its energy for development along
previously assigned trajectory and reached the bifurcation point,
whereas its further improvement (possibly, subject to a
confederal political structure) or gradual preservation and decline
depend upon the direction in which the point is passed.
Most probably, changes in the EU political (elections and es-
tablishment of a new European Commission) and economic (es-
tablishment of fiscal and banking unions) systems in 2014 will
not allow the monetary union to remain in limbo for too long.
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